This decision was likely made at the political level, since the Russian military’s doctrine, exercises, and previous conflicts all prioritized combined arms. In addition, Russian forces were given insufficient time to prepare for such a complex operation. Russian ground units simply drove toward cities, unprepared for a fight. Because they expected little resistance, Russian forces made minimal attempts at executing a coherent combined-arms operation, which would have required careful coordination and planning between air, ground, and naval forces. Russia’s initial operation prioritized speed and secrecy above all other factors. The use of Javelins and other light anti-tank systems in Ukraine has not demonstrated that the tank is obsolete any more than the Sagger anti-tank guided missile did in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as discussed by David Johnson in these pages. Russia’s heavy tank losses can be explained by employment mistakes, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support, and Ukrainian artillery. The available data from Ukraine, as well as the recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh, indicate that tanks are still critical in modern warfare and their vulnerabilities have been exaggerated. As a result, specific weapon systems may appear to be ineffective based on how and where they are employed, not necessarily due to their inherent shortcomings.
There is still much about this war that is not known from open sources, and there is good reason to think that the conditions that marked its early phases will not necessarily be relevant to future conflicts. After six months of war in Ukraine, some observers have insisted that “we are seeing the very nature of combat change” and that tanks, along with fighter jets and warships, “are being pushed into obsolescence.”īut it is too soon to write off the tank, and we should resist jumping to other sweeping conclusions about the future of warfare based on a conflict whose lessons are not yet clear.
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